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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous values are promoted under the American legal
system. While business growth is encouraged by various state
and federal laws,' the legal system also recognizes and pro-
motes an individual's freedom from negligent and intentional
harms.2 At times, however, these two separate values can
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1. Most state codes authorize the corporate form of business organization, which
bestows certain distinct advantages. For example, one of the most recognized
advantages of corporate formation is the availability of limited liability for investors,
which encourages investment in business enterprise. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.06.220 (1989) (limiting the liability of shareholders to consideration paid for the
shares purchased or as otherwise specified in the subscription agreement).
In addition, specific legislative declarations recognize the benefits to a state's
economic base from the promotion of business development. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.170.010 (1989) (recognizing the benefits of small businesses created by innovators
and inventors); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.210.010 (1989) (recognizing and promoting
export businesses).
2. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various state courts either
did not recognize or only recognized a limited contractual remedy available for
insureds seeking to redress certain insurance claim settlement procedures common at
that time. STEPHEN S. AsHLEY, BAD FArrH ACTIONS § 2.02 (1984 & Supp. 1990). These
practices included situations where the insurer would assume the insured's defense
pursuant to the policy and, in exercising this control, would refuse to accept a
settlement offer within the policy limits unless the insured contributed to the
settlement. Id. While rejecting contract claims in this area, the courts recognized the
potential for tort remedies in situations involving abusive claim settlement procedures.
Id. at § 2.03.
The availability of tort remedies is based on various theories of negligence and
fraud. Id. The recognition of tort remedies in insured/insurer disputes is generally
attributable to two factors. First, the insurance industry's activity is strongly related to
and affected by the public interest. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1989) (stating
the business of insurance is one affected by the public interest); Salois v. Mutual of
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clash in cases such as bad faith litigation between insureds and
their insurance companies. Bad faith litigation arises when an
insurance company denies payment of a claim submitted by an
insured, and the insured pursues judicial relief on grounds that
the insurer's denial is not appropriately based.' In Washing-
ton, the relationship between an insurance company and its
insured is governed by common, statutory, and administrative
law.4 The Washington Supreme Court recently considered
these laws as they apply to bad faith litigation in Industrial
Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig.5
Before the Kallevig decision can be placed into context
and analyzed, one must consider the development of bad faith
litigation in Washington. The body of law governing bad faith
litigation in Washington developed primarily over the past
twenty-five years. While previously requiring the business of
insurance be actuated in good faith,' the Washington State
Legislature repealed the insurance exemption from the Con-
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978) (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 48.01.030 and declaring a public interest in the business of insurance). Second,
insurance contracts are usually considered to be contracts of adhesion because of the
normal disparity in bargaining power between the insured and the insurance company.
WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FArrH LIIGATION § 1.03 (1986).
3. The underlying insurance company activity that is recognized as constituting
bad faith conduct can be the insurer's inadequate investigation, delay, deception,
wrongful cancellation, nondisclosure, and liability arising from the misconduct of the
insurer's agents. JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGEs FOR BAD FAITH §§ 1.10-
1.19 (5th ed. 1990).
4. See Pierce County v. Highlands Ins. Co., 59 Wash. App. 782, 801 P.2d 284 (1990)
(stating that a bad faith insurance analysis under the Consumer Protection Act
"requires a generalized excursion through the statute and the case law"). See also
Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
ch. 284-30 (1990).
Although insurance transactions are governed by statutory, administrative, and
common law, one may better appreciate the duties and restrictions imposed by
legislatures, regulators, and courts by considering the underlying relationship of the
insured and insurer. The underlying motivation of all insurance purchasers is the
acknowledgement and management of perceived risk. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN 1.
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3 (1988) (recognizing two principal characteristics of
insurance as the transfer and distribution of risk). By choosing to manage a perceived
risk through the acquisition of insurance, purchasers acknowledge, at least implicitly,
that the value derived from the insurance (i.e. the risk avoided) outweighs the cost of
the insurance. In effect, the insured is purchasing "peace of mind." SHERNOFF ET AL,
supra note 2, at § 1.02. This expectation of the insured, coupled with the inherent
characteristics of an insurance contract and public interest considerations, creates the
basis for various statutory and common law provisions concerning the insured/insurer
relationship. Id.
5. 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520 (1990).
6. 1911 Wash. Laws ch. 49, § 1 (codified as amended at WASH. REv. CODE
§ 48.01.030 (1989)).
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sumer Protection Act (CPA) to ensure sufficient reimburse-
ment to the insured and to deter unjustified claim denials.7 In
1970, Washington courts followed this trend by explicitly rec-
ognizing that a fiduciary relationship exists between an insurer
and its insured.' At the same time, while recognizing and pro-
moting an insured's ability to recover when an unjustified
claim denial occurs,9 the courts have attempted to develop a
bad faith standard that allows insurers some flexibility in pro-
tecting their own interests.' Under this standard, Washington
7. 1967 Wash. Laws ch. 147, § 1 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.170 (1989)). Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), an
individual may bring a civil action to recover actual damages to his or her business or
property arising from certain violations. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1989). Such
violations occur in certain enumerated situations including those involving an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1989), or a monopoly, WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.040 (1989). In addition to recovering actual damages and costs of the
suit, the action may enjoin further violations, and the court may increase the damages
up to three times the actual damages. However, in situations involving an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, the increased damages may be no more than ten thousand
dollars. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1989). The imposition of liability for costs of
the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and increased damages can be considered
extracontractual damages because they are imposed in addition to actual damages from
breach of the insurance contract.
8. Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970). The case
involved an insurance company's failure to settle a claim within automobile liability
insurance policy limits. The court stated that the insurer's duty to refrain from acting
in bad faith was founded on the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and its
insured and that this duty implied a broad obligation of fair dealing. Id. at 173, 473
P.2d at 197. Consequently, when an insurer acts pursuant to its right to defend and
settle a claim, the insurer must act in good faith and with ordinary care. Id. at 176, 473
P.2d at 199. To satisfy this duty, the insurer must consider the insured's interests
equal to those of its own. Id. at 177, 473 P.2d at 199. In addition, the court cited an
insurer's responsibility under its duty of good faith to investigate properly the
prospective amount of damages when the insurer defends an action brought against its
insured. Id. at 179, 473 P.2d at 200.
9. See Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520 (1990);
Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wash. 2d 330, 729 P.2d 249 (1989); Transcontinental
Ins. v. Utility System, 111 Wash. 2d 452, 760 P.2d 337 (1988); Schroeder v. Royal Globe
Ins., 99 Wash. 2d 65, 659 P.2d 509 (1983); Salois v. Mutual of Omaha, 90 Wash. 2d 355,
581 P.2d 1349 (1978); Evergreen Int'l v. American Casualty Co., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761
P.2d 964 (1988); Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 49 Wash. App. 375, 743 P.2d 832 (1987), review
denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988); Castle & Cooke v. Great Am. Ins., 42 Wash. App. 508,
711 P.2d 1108, review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986); Whistman v. West American,
38 Wash. App. 580, 686 P.2d 1086 (1984); Smith v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 37 Wash. App.
71, 678 P.2d 829 (1984); Safeco Ins. Co. v. JMG Restaurant, 37 Wash. App. 1, 680 P.2d
409 (1984); Miller v. Indiana Ins. Co., 31 Wash. App. 475, 642 P.2d 769 (1982).
10. See Schroeder v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 2d 65, 659 P.2d 509 (1983)
(holding an insurer's denial of coverage does not breach the insurer's good faith
fiduciary duty); Pierce County v. Highlands Ins. Co., 59 Wash. App. 782, 801 P.2d 284
(1990) (stating that an insurer's clumsy conduct is not unreasonable in a situation
involving a complicated insurance claim); Smith v. Ohio Casualty Ins., 37 Wash. App.
71, 678 P.2d 829 (1984) (holding a mere denial of coverage because of a debatable
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courts review an insurance company's actions and surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the insurer was reason-
ably justified in denying a claim."
The Washington Supreme Court in Kallevig employed this
reasonable justification standard for determining whether an
insurer acted in bad faith by denying a claim. While this stan-
dard is consistent with prior case law,'2 a subsequent appellate
court decision applied an arguably less onerous bad faith stan-
dard in Gingrich v. Unigard Security Insurance Co.' 3 The
standard applied by the Gingrich court required consideration
of whether an insurer's actions were unreasonable, frivolous,
or untenable. 14 Because this standard is less onerous than the
reasonable justification standard of Kallevig, insurers may
attempt to avoid the Kallevig standard and its underlying pub-
lic interest considerations by recharacterizing claim denials in
a manner more closely analogous to the denial in Gingrich.
In addition to applying a reasonable justification standard,
the Kallevig court held that a single violation of the insurance
commissioner's regulations delineating unfair business prac-
tices was sufficient to impose CPA liability upon the insurer.
This holding, however, disregards the frequency provision
within the regulations. In order to constitute unfair claims set-
tlement practices, the frequency provision requires violation of
the regulations with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice.15
Because of the potential uncertainty created by two incon-
sistent bad faith standards articulated in Kallevig and Ging-
rich, and the failure to recognize a regulatory frequency
provision, this Note posits two recommendations. First, in
order to harmonize the bad faith standards applied in Kallevig
and Gingrich, the Kallevig reasonable justification standard
should be applied in situations involving questions similar to
those confronted by the Gingrich court. Second, this Note con-
coverage question does not give rise to a CPA violation); Miller v. Indiana Ins. Co., 31
Wash. App. 475, 642 P.2d 769 (1982) (holding an insurer's denial of benefits because of
a debatable question is insufficient to show bad faith).
11. Whistman, 38 Wash. App. at 5844585, 686 P.2d at 1089; Safeco Ins. Co., 37
Wash. App. at 15, 680 P.2d at 418 (holding an insurer's refusal to pay a claim on the
basis of suspicions and conjectures may violate a fiduciary duty of good faith because
such a refusal must be reasonably based).
12. See supra note 11.
13. 57 Wash. App. 424, 788 P.2d 1096 (1990).
14. Id. at 434, 788 P.2d at 1102.
15. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 (1990).
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tends that the Kallevig court's analysis imposing liability under
the CPA was defective because it failed to take proper account
of the frequency requirement within the unfair trade practices
regulations. By ignoring the frequency provision, the Kallevig
decision allows inconsistent treatment of similar factual situa-
tions depending on whether the decision is being made by an
agency or judicial body. As such, the legislature should review
the appropriateness of a frequency requirement for determin-
ing unfair business practices. If its review establishes the
appropriateness of this requirement, the legislature should
amend the unfair business practices statute to prevent a single
violation of the unfair trade practices regulations from serving
as the basis for CPA liability.
To provide a basis for analyzing the Kallevig decision, this
Note will first review the development of the bad faith stan-
dard employed in Washington. The Note will then discuss the
facts in Kallevig and consider the imposition of the bad faith
standards employed by the Kallevig and Gingrich courts.
Lastly, the court's analysis for the imposition of CPA liability
will be reviewed and critiqued.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LIABILITY OF INSURERS
Bad faith liability is a general categorization for liability
imposed upon an insurer when the insurer has acted in bad
faith. These actions include inadequate investigation,
unfounded settlement delay, or wrongful cancellation.'" The
consideration of bad faith liability can be separated into two
distinct areas: (1) the formulation of the standard used to mea-
sure an insurance company's conduct and (2) the mechanism
employed to enforce compliance with this standard.
In Washington, the first recognition of an insurer's bad
faith liability to an insured was in Tyler v. Grange Insurance
Association.7 In considering the refusal to settle a claim
within an insurance policy's limits, the Tyler court recognized
an insurer's contractual right to defend and settle a claim. The
court noted, however, that an insurer owed a duty of good faith
arising from a fiduciary relationship between an insurer and
insured.'8 Since the recognition of this fiduciary duty in Tyler,
several decisions have expanded and clarified the duty owed to
16. See supra note 3.
17. 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970).
18. Id. at 173, 473 P.2d at 197.
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an insured by an insurance company.19 For example, while
Tyler addressed an insurer's duty to settle a claim within pol-
icy limits,' the Washington Supreme Court later considered
the insurer's duty to pay an insured's claim.21 In this context,
the court held that insurers had a broad obligation of fair deal-
ing, therefore, a specific showing of dishonesty, misrepresenta-
tion, deceit, or fraud was not required to impose penalties
under the CPA.22
On the other hand, rather than describe an insurer's duty
as a broad obligation of fair dealing, some Washington courts
have formulated this duty differently. For example, bad faith
action can be shown by a frivolous and unfounded denial of
policy benefits, while the denial of benefits due to a debatable
question of coverage is insufficient for a bad faith claim.'
19. See Schroeder v. Royal Globe Ins., 99 Wash. 2d 65, 659 P.2d 509 (1983); Safeco
Ins. Co. v. JMG Restaurant, 37 Wash. App. 1, 680 P.2d 409 (1984); Miller v. Indiana Ins.
Co., 31 Wash. App. 475, 642 P.2d 769 (1982).
20. Tyler, 3 Wash. App. at 172-76, 473 P.2d at 197-99.
21. Schroeder, 99 Wash. 2d at 74, 659 P.2d at 514. In Schroeder, the insured was a
carpet cleaning business that sought recovery under a property liability policy for the
cost of replacing a carpet destroyed by a malfunctioning carpet cleaning machine
operated by an employee of the insured. Id. at 66, 659 P.2d at 510. The insurer denied
coverage based upon a policy exclusion and reliance on prior case law regarding the
interpretation of policy exclusions. Id. at 68, 72, 659 P.2d at 511, 513. Although the
court found the exclusionary provision did not apply in this situation, the court held
that the insurer did not breach its good faith fiduciary duty in refusing to extend
coverage in the absence of litigation. Id. at 74, 659 P.2d at 514; but see 16 GEORGE J.
COUCH, INSURANCE § 58:173 (2d ed. 1966) (stating that an insurer's claim refusal based
upon an erroneous construction of its policy and applicable law may be sufficient to
impose statutory penalties and attorneys' fees).
22. Schroeder, 99 Wash. 2d at 74, 659 P.2d at 514.
23. In Miller v. Indiana Ins. Co., 31 Wash. App. 475, 642 P.2d 769 (1982), the
insurer denied the insured's claim for the theft of a customer's goods that were in the
insured's vehicle during the course of his business. The court first considered the
applicable insurance policy provisions and determined that the policy exclusion used as
the basis for denial by the insurer did not apply to this situation. The court next
considered whether the insurer's actions constituted bad faith, thus invoking the CPA.
In deciding this question, the court held that the insurer denied coverage based upon a
"reasonable interpretation of the policy" and that such an action did not constitute bad
faith as a matter of law. Id. at 479, 642 P.2d at 771.
The Washington Supreme Court also reached a similar result in considering
whether an insurance company acted improperly by seeking a declaratory judgment on
the issue of coverage provided under two policies. Transcontinental Ins. v. Utility
System, 111 Wash. 2d 452, 760 P.2d 337 (1988). Both policies were special excess
liability policies that provided coverage for losses exceeding a certain limit covered by
the insured's self-insurance agreement. Id. at 454-55, 760 P.2d at 339. Similar to the
court in Miller, the Transcontinental court examined the policies' language and
determined that both policies provided coverage for the insured's officers, directors,
and employees acting within their duties for liabilities arising out of litigation over a
$2.25 billion bond default. Id. at 464, 760 P.2d at 344. The court also held that the
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Another court stated that the insured must prove the insur-
ance company did not act fairly, honestly, and objectively, or
the insurer acted without reasonable justification in refusing
the claim.' Most recently, the Kallevig court considered
whether the insurer was reasonably justified in denying a
claim.
Along with developing a standard for measuring an insur-
ance company's conduct, courts have considered which mecha-
nism should be used to enforce compliance with this standard.
The appellate court in Tyler recognized a duty sounding in tort
in order to encourage the insurer to consider the insured's
interests when settling a claim.' The Washington Supreme
Court, however, has not expressly recognized an insurer's duty
to an insured in bad faith actions as giving rise to a tort.'
Instead, Washington and a minority of other states have
enacted a statutory framework through which an insured can
recover under the CPA.2' By using a statutory framework to
insurer's actions were not sufficient to constitute bad faith because they were not
unreasonable, frivolous, or untenable. Id. at 470-71, 760 P.2d at 347.
24. Safeco Ins. Co. v. JMG Restaurant, 37 Wash. App. 1, 14-15, 680 P.2d 409, 418
(1984). The Safeco court considered a factually analogous situation to that in Kallevig.
In Safeco, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer was not liable
under a fire policy for fire damage caused to a restaurant owned by the insureds. Id. at
3, 680 P.2d at 412. Evidence was presented that the fire department arson squad
suspected the insured of arson, that the insured was in financial trouble, and that the
insured was seen leaving the restaurant shortly before the fire. Id. at 14-15, 680 P.2d at
418. However, the court stated that the arson suspicions were not sufficient to
implicate the insured, that the evidence indicating that the insured was in financial
trouble was disputed, and that another person may have left the restaurant without
being seen. Id. Lastly, the insurer's reliance on the fact that an insured was a suspect
for arson was considered unreasonable because the prosecutor later dropped arson
charges. Id. at 15, 680 P.2d at 418. Consequently, the court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the insured on a CPA claim. Id.
25. Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 172, 473 P.2d 193, 197 (1970).
26. See Patricia G. Stegmaier, An Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay a Valid First
Party Claim" A Tort Whose Time Has Come in Iowa, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 987 (1983). A
majority of jurisdictions have recognized a tort action in situations where the insured
acted in bad faith against the first party insured. Id. at 990. Support for recognizing
such a tort has primarily been found in three areas. First, the quasi-public nature of
the insurance business is seen as justifying the imposition of a tort to protect and
benefit first-party insureds. Id. at 989. Second, an insured is viewed as purchasing an
insurance policy for financial protection against a calamity and to promote financial
peace of mind, not to gain a personal commercial advantage. As such, denying the
insured his or her benefit of a bargain with the insurer would be unfair. Id. at 990.
Third, a bad faith tort remedy is considered an "equalizing power" to enable the
insured to recoup consequential and potentially punitive damages. Id. See also infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
27. See RowLAND H. LONG, THE LAw OF LIABILIT INSURANCE § 5B.11 (1986). See
also Stegmaier, supra note 26, at 996 (indicating that a minority of states have adopted
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impose liability in bad faith actions, the Washington State Leg-
islature created a system that attempts to balance compensat-
ing an injured insured with enabling the insurer to protect its
interests.' The Washington Supreme Court recently applied
this statutory framework for bad faith actions in Kallevig.
legislation delineating unfair and deceptive acts or practices that, if violated, provide
sufficient remedy for an insurer's bad faith actions).
Another reason cited for imposing a statutory penalty rather than providing an
action in tort in bad faith actions is the potential for excessive punitive damage awards
that could impair the financial status of an insurer, overcompensate the insured, and
increase premiums to the general public. See Bradley J. Fisher, Egan v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co.: The Exzpanding Use of Punitive Damages in Breach of Insurance
Contract Actions, 15 SAN DIEGO L REv. 287, 304-05 (1978) (stating that insurance
companies are particularly vulnerable to punitive damage awards because they are not
favored by juries).
28. See supra notes 26 and 27. The public nature of the insurance business is
recognized in Washington through WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1989). The
imposition of CPA liability through WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.170 (1989) enables the
injured insured to recover the benefit of his or her bargain with the insurer. The first
two policy reasons usually given for recognizing a bad faith tort (the protection of first-
party insureds and the promotion of the insured's financial protection) are achieved
under this statutory framework. The third policy reason cited for a bad faith tort is
the recovery of consequential and punitive damages. While consequential damages are
available under Washington's statutory scheme, unbounded punitive damages are not
permissible. Instead, the CPA sets forth various limitations on extracontractual
damages. See supra notes 6-7. Thus, the primary difference between the bad faith tort
and Washington's statutory framework is the limitation on punitive damages.
The Washington approach is preferable because it more efficiently balances the
interests of the insurer with those of the insured. In considering the merits of
imposing punitive damages in bad faith actions, one should note that the underlying
relationship between the insured and insurer is based upon an insurance contract. As
such, appropriate deference should be given to the contracting parties. In addition,
although insurers are subject to considerable state regulation, insurers are entitled to a
reasonable underwriting profit. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.19.030(c) (1989) (indicating that
consideration is to be given to a reasonable margin for underwriting profit in the
insurance rate-making process). Furthermore, the premiums and policy forms used
for many types of insurance coverage must be approved by the insurance commissioner
prior to their use. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 48.19 (1989). It is important to recognize the
statutorily authorized profit-making nature of the insurance industry and the
industry's ability to receive the benefits of the bargain entered into with the insured.
As such, the law in bad faith actions must enable the insurer to protect these
statutorily recognized benefits. By imposing the potential of unlimited punitive
damages awards, the insurer's ability to receive the benefit derived from its insurance
contracts would be substantially impaired. See Miller v. Indiana Ins. Co., 31 Wash.
App. 475, 642 P.2d 769 (1982) (recognizing the insurer's right to deny benefits due to a
debatable question of coverage). Thus, by limiting the extracontractual damages that
are awardable under the CPA, the insured receives sufficient compensation, and the
insurer is deterred from inappropriate behavior without the potential for excessive
liability.
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III. THE DECISION IN KALLEVIG
A. The Facts of the Case
On January 27, 1986, the Peach Tree Restaurant was
destroyed by fire.' The restaurant, owned by David and
Judith Kallevig, was insured by Industrial Indemnity Company
of the Northwest, Inc.3° Following a claim under the restau-
rant's policy, Industrial Indemnity brought an action for
declaratory judgment alleging that David Kallevig intention-
ally caused the fire. The Kallevigs, in turn, counterclaimed for
damages under contract and CPA theories.
On the evening of the fire, two employees closed the res-
taurant and turned off the electrical switches in the food prep-
aration area. Shortly thereafter, David Kallevig arrived at the
restaurant, counted the money, and placed the money into a
floor safe. The fire was reported to the Yakima Fire Depart-
ment approximately one-half hour after Kallevig left.31
At trial, Industrial Indemnity and Kallevig offered con-
flicting evidence as to the cause of the fire. Industrial Indem-
nity produced evidence that the source of the fire was in the
food preparation area, although no evidence typically associ-
ated with arson was found.' In fact, a local fire department
investigator pinpointed the origin as being immediately below
the food preparation table. The investigator consulted an elec-
trical expert who concluded that the hot plate was turned on
during the fire and that no malfunction was found in the elec-
trical outlet or hotplate. The investigator also learned that
the restaurant may have been in financial difficulty. A credi-
tor's late notice was found in a restaurant garbage can, and the
investigator discovered that the Department of Labor and
Industries had filed a lien against Kallevig on the day of the
fire.' Based upon these findings, the fire department investi-
29. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 910, 792 P.2d 520, 523
(1990).
30. The policy provided coverage for the restaurant building up to $100,000, the
restaurant contents up to $25,000, and lost income after an insurable loss up to $18,000.
Id. at 910 n.1, 792 P.2d at 523 n.1.
31. Id. at 910-11, 792 P.2d at 523.
32. Id. at 911, 792 P.2d at 523. The fire department investigator testified at trial
that no evidence of incendiary devices, accelerants, trailers, multiple ignition points, or
other evidence associated with arson was found. Id.
33. Id. at 911, 792 P.2d at 523 (indicating that the electrical expert reached his
conclusions even though he was not allowed to completely dismantle the outlet box).
34. Id.
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gator opined that David Kallevig intentionally caused the
fire.35
In addition to the fire department investigator's opinion,
Industrial Indemnity's claims representative relied upon its
own independent fire investigator.' Industrial Indemnity's
investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally set and
notified the claims representative of this conclusion. The
claims representative also obtained an internal underwriter's
report that stated the cause of the fire may have been the
result of faulty workmanship by an electrical contractor.
Industrial Indemnity, however, did not retain an electrical
expert to investigate this possibility.' Based upon the fire
department investigation and the conclusions of the indepen-
dent investigator, Industrial Indemnity denied the Kallevigs'
claim.s8
The Kallevigs pursued their own investigation and con-
ducted tests that demonstrated the hot plate could not have
started the fire.s9 The Kallevigs hired a fire protection con-
sultant who, along with an electrical engineer, concluded that
the origin of the fire was a faulty outlet box and that the fire
department's investigation was inadequate because it failed to
find a breaker that was tripped.'
B. The Trial Court and Appellate Court Decisions
At the trial court level, the jury found that Industrial
Indemnity acted in bad faith in denying the Kallevigs' claim
and awarded damages to the Kallevigs.41 The trial court
denied Industrial Indemnity's motion for a directed verdict on
the bad faith and CPA counterclaim. A unanimous jury then
found that David Kallevig did not start the fire and that Indus-
trial Indemnity's decision to deny coverage was unreasonable.
The jury awarded $128,104.69 for the breach of contract and
$20,000 for the CPA violation. The trial judge, pursuant to
35. Id. at 911-12, 792 P.2d at 523 (stating that the fire department investigator
believed that the insured had the opportunity and motive to cause the fire).
36. Id. at 912, 792 P.2d at 524.
37. Id. at 912-13, 792 P.2d at 524.
38. Id. at 913, 792 P.2d at 524.
39. Id. The hot plate tests also indicated that the wall would not ignite even when
combustibles were placed on the hot plate. Id
40. Id. at 913, 792 P.2d at 524.
41. During the proceedings, the trial court entered an order in limine preventing
Industrial Indemnity from presenting evidence that a factor in the company's decision
to deny the claim was David Kallevig's refusal to take a polygraph test. Id.
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Revised Code of Washington (RCW) § 19.86.090, increased
damages by $10,000 and awarded $64,422 for attorney's fees. 42
The appellate court rejected Industrial Indemnity's con-
tention that the trial court erred by denying the motions for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
on the Kallevig's CPA claim.43 The standard of review applied
by the appellate court was whether, as a matter of law, the evi-
dence or reasonable inferences therefrom, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could not support
a verdict for the nonmoving party.44 In its analysis, the court
focused on (1) the lack of evidence of any accelerant used to
start the fire, (2) the insurer's reliance on an electrical expert
who did not visit the scene or completely dismantle the outlet
box, and (3) Mr. Kallevig's contrary assertion and evidence
that he did not cause the fire. Relying on these facts, the court
held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that a
reasonable insurer would have conducted a more extensive
investigation.45
C. The Washington Supreme Court's Decision
The Washington Supreme Court applied the same stan-
dard of review employed by the appellate court to review the
trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict and judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.' Applying this standard,
the court considered two questions. First, the court addressed
what constitutes a bad faith denial of coverage. Second, the
court considered whether the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to find that Industrial Indemnity denied coverage in bad
faith.
In determining what constitutes a bad faith denial of an
insurance claim in Washington, the court looked to both statu-
tory and common law. Citing RCW § 48.01.030,"7 the court rec-
42. Id. at 914-15, 792 P.2d at 525.
43. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 54 Wash. App. 558, 774 P.2d 1230 (1989).
44. Id. at 562, 774 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Cowsert v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 101
Wash. 2d 402, 405, 680 P.2d 46, 49 (1984)); see infra note 46.
45. Id. at 563, 774 P.2d at 1233.
46. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 915-16, 792 P.2d at 525 (citing Boeing Co. v. Sierracin
Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 38, 67, 738 P.2d 665, 683 (1987)) ("A directed verdict or judgment
n.o.v. is appropriate if, when viewing the material evidence most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial
evidence of reasonable inferences to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party.").
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1989) provides, in part, that "[t]he business of
insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all persons be actuated
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ognized that insurers must act in good faith in dealing with
their insureds.48 The court further clarified this fiduciary duty
by examining several prior decisions.49 These decisions recog-
nized that the duty to act in good faith is "fairly broad and may
be breached by conduct short of intentional bad faith or
fraud."5  Based on this analysis, the court summarized an
insurer's duty in denying a claim as follows:
[a]n insurer does not have a reasonable basis for denying
coverage and, therefore, acts without reasonable justification
when it denies coverage based upon suspicion and conjec-
ture.... [A]n insurer must make a good faith investigation
of the facts before denying coverage and may not deny cov-
erage based on a supposed defense which a reasonable inves-
tigation would have proved to be without merit.
5 '
Applying this rule to the facts in the case, the court held that
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.5 2 The
court then rejected Industrial Indemnity's argument that the
company did not act in bad faith as a matter of policy because
the company relied upon a local fire authority's determination
that the fire was caused by arson.'
In rejecting Industrial Indemnity's proposition, the court
promoted, at least implicitly, a thorough investigation by the
insurance company. Had the court accepted this proposition,
Washington insurers would have little incentive to fully inves-
tigate claims when independent investigator's reports support
by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance
matters."
48. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 916, 792 P.2d at 526 (citing Pruitt v. Alaska Pac.
Assur. Co., 28 Wash. App. 802, 804, 626 P.2d 528, 529 (1981)).
49. Id. at 917, 792 P.2d at 526 (citing Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.,
99 Wash. 2d 65, 73, 659 P.2d 509, 514 (1983); Whistman v. West Am., 38 Wash. App. 580,
584-85, 686 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1984); Safeco Ins. Co. v. JMG Restaurant Inc., 37 Wash.
App. 1, 11-12, 680 P.2d 409, 416 (1984)).
50. Id.
51. Id. For this proposition, the court cites Sqfeco, 37 Wash. App. at 15, 680 P.2d at
15, and Schroeder, 99 Wash. 2d at 15, 659 P.2d at 74 (quoting 16 GEORGE J. COUCH,
INSURANCE § 58:168 (2d ed. 1966)).
52. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court assessed the factors considered
by Industrial Indemnity in denying the claim and contrary evidence offered by the
Kallevigs. In addition, the court considered a factually similar case, Safeco Ins. Co. v.
JMG Restaurant, 37 Wash. App. 1, 680 P.2d 409 (1984). See supra note 24 (discussing
Safeco).
53. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 920, 792 P.2d at 528. The court noted the lack of
authority for this proposition and declared the determinative factor to be the
reasonableness of the insurer's action in light of all the surrounding circumstances, not
the stature of any one investigator.
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the interests of the insurer. Conversely, in situations where an
investigator's finding is at odds with the interests of the
insurer, the insurer may initiate or continue an investigation to
rebut the independent investigator's findings. As a result, the
focus and extent of the insurer's efforts would become depen-
dent upon an investigator's findings. Consequently, to
encourage an appropriate amount of investigation by the
insurer without undue reliance on an independent investiga-
tor's conclusions, the court rejected the proposition in order to
promote reasonable conduct by the insurer.
Having determined that Industrial Indemnity was not rea-
sonably justified in denying the Kallevigs' claim, the court
turned to the question of whether a single violation of the
Washington Administrative Code (WAC) § 284-30-3304 consti-
tuted an unfair or deceptive trade practice under RCW
§ 48.30.010.1 Pursuant to authority granted in RCW
§ 48.30.010(2), the insurance commissioner adopted unfair
claims settlement regulations to establish minimum standards
for claims settlement practices-' Failure of an insurer to com-
ply with these standards is considered an unfair act or practice
under the insurance code. 7 This characterization is important
54. In 1978, the insurance commissioner adopted WASH. ADMn. CODE § 284-30-330,
which defines 19 types of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the business of insurance. Wash. St. Reg. 78-08-082.
A National Association of Insurance Commissioners' questionnaire dated March 7,
1983 and completed by a public defender, who acted as the deputy commissioner for
Washington State's insurance commissioner, provides an indication of the intent
behind the adoption of the regulation. A response to a question concerning whether a
private right of action is allowed under the unfair claims settlement practices
regulation indicates that the sole intent behind the regulation was to implement an
administrative enforcement mechanism for the benefit of the public at large and not to
afford a private cause of action (questionnaire on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010 (1989) provides, in part, that
(1) [n]o person engaged in the business of insurance shall engage in unfair
methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of such business as such methods, acts, or practices are defined
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
(2) In addition to such unfair methods and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices as are expressly defined and prohibited by this code, the
commissioner may from time to time by regulation... define other methods
of competition and other acts and practices in the conduct of this business
reasonably found by the commissioner to be unfair or deceptive.
Thus, the regulations adopted by the commissioner pursuant to subsection (2) of this
statute are not an exclusive list of unfair or deceptive acts or practices but rather a
guide to practices the commissioner finds to be unfair or deceptive.
56. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-30 (1990).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010(2) (1989).
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from the standpoint of CPA liability. Under the CPA,
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" are
unlawful,' and a private citizen may enforce a violation of this
CPA provision through a civil action. 9
In order for a private citizen to bring a successful CPA
action, the private party must satisfy a five-part test set forth
in Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins.
Co. 6° To satisfy this test, the private plaintiff must prove that
the defendant's act or practice (1) is unfair or deceptive, (2)
occurs in the conduct of any trade or commerce, (3) affects the
public interest, (4) injures the plaintiff in his business or prop-
erty, and (5) creates a causal link between the injury and the
unfair or deceptive act.61
A plaintiff's burden of satisfying this test is eased if the
defendant's action or practice violates a Washington State stat-
ute declaring that action or practice to be unfair or deceptive,
such as RCW § 48.30.010.62 When a defendant's action violates
a statute declaring that action to be unfair or deceptive, the
action is considered to be a per se unfair business practice.'
As such, the per se unfair business practice satisfies the first
and second elements of the CPA private action test. Conse-
quently, the issue becomes especially important whether an
insurer's single violation of WAC § 284-30-330 is an unfair busi-
ness practice under RCW § 48.30.010. If a single violation of
the WAC regulation constitutes an unfair or deceptive action
under RCW § 48.30.010, the action is a per se unfair business
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1989).
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1989).
60. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 920-21, 792 P.2d 520, 528
(1990) (citing Hangman Ridge Training Stable, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.
2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986)).
61. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 784-85, 719 P.2d at 535.
62. In addition to WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010 in the insurance code, numerous
statutes governing various industries provide that their violation constitutes an unfair
business practice for purposes of the CPA. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.102.020
(1989) (pyramid selling); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.105.500 (1989) (camping resorts);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.070 (1989) (credit service organizations); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.138.080 (1989) (travel charter and tour operators); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.142.100
(1989) (health studios); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.100 (1989) (mortgage brokers);
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.180 (1989) (motor vehicle dealers); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.19.270 (1989) (land development); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.36.170 (1989)
(timeshares); WASH. REV. CODE § 68.05.330 (1989) (funeral homes).
63. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 786, 719 P.2d at 535 (stating that a violation
of a statute declared by the legislature to constitute an unfair or deceptive act in trade
or commerce is a per se unfair trade practice for purposes of the CPA).
[Vol. 15:203
1991] Imposition of Bad Faith Liability
practice, and the plaintiff must only prove the final three ele-
ments of the CPA private action test. Otherwise, the plaintiff
possesses the burden of proving all five elements to bring a
successful CPA action.
In considering this issue, the Washington Supreme Court
indicated that the court had previously considered on two occa-
sions whether a single instance of conduct violating WAC
§ 284-30-330 constitutes a violation of RCW § 48.30.010(1). 4 In
both instances, the court declared that the issue was unclear
because WAC § 284-30-300 contains a frequency provision.'
Prior to the supreme court's consideration of this issue, the
court of appeals held that a single violation of WAC § 284-30-
300 constituted an unfair business practice under RCW
§ 48.30.010 and, thus, was a per se unfair trade practice under
the CPA.' However, the supreme court in Kallevig rejected
the appellate court's reasoning6 7 because it gave ipso facto lia-
bility under the CPA for a violation of WAC § 284-30-330.1
Instead, the supreme court substituted the following reasoning:
64. Kailevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 923 n.9, 792 P.2d at 530 n.9 (citing VilleUa v. Public
Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 806, 725 P.2d 957 (1986); Federated Am. Ins. Co.
v. Strong, 102 Wash. 2d 665, 689 P.2d 68 (1984)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 923, 792 P.2d at 529-30 (citing Evergreen Int'l, Inc. v. American Casualty
Co., 52 Wash. App. 548, 761 P.2d 964 (1988); Escalante v. Sentry Ins. Co., 49 Wash. App.
375, 743 P.2d 832 (1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988)).
67. In Escalante, the insurer for the driver of an automobile involved in an
accident denied underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to the family and estate of a
passenger killed in the accident. During the settlement negotiations, the insurer
continually asserted that the family and estate must collect the UIM coverage from
the deceased passenger's insurer. Escalante, 49 Wash. App. at 379-81, 743 P.2d at 834-
36. In determining whether a private right of action was created under certain
insurance commissioner regulations, the court considered the language in WASH. REV.
CODE § 48.30.010 and WAH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 and concluded that there was
"no clearly expressed intent . . . to provide private causes of action for isolated
violations of the regulations." Id. at 389, 743 P.2d at 840. However, the court held that
the CPA created a private right of action for violations of regulations set forth in
WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 284-30. Escalante, 49 Wash. App. at 390, 743 P.2d at 840 (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 providing, in part, that "actions and transactions
prohibited or regulated under the laws administered by the insurance commissioner"
are subject to certain CPA provisions).
The Court of Appeals in Evergreen accepted the analysis in Escalante,
distinguishing the goals served by the insurance commissioner's enforcement of the
regulations from the purposes set forth in the CPA. Evergreen, 52 Wash. App. at 558,
761 P.2d at 969. As such, the frequency of violation provision contained in WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 is consistent with the insurance commissioner's purpose but
is inconsistent with the liberally construed CPA. Id. As a result, the court concluded
that an isolated violation of WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 constitutes a per se
unfair trade practice for purposes of the analysis under Hangman Ridge. Id.
68. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 924, 792 P.2d at 530.
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[Alny violation that would constitute an unfair trade prac-
tice under WAC § 284-30-330 is an unfair trade practice
under RCW § 48.30.010 regardless of whether it would take
more than a single violation of WAC § 284-30-330 for the
insurance commissioner to exercise any administrative pow-
ers to seek corrective action or penalties against the
insurer.
69
Thus, the court found that the frequency requirement in WAC
§ 284-30-30070 did not have to be satisfied because no such
requirement is set forth within RCW § 48.30.010. 71 As a result,
the court held that a violation of RCW § 48.30.010, based upon
a single violation of WAC § 284-30-330, was a per se unfair
trade practice under the CPA.72
Finally, the supreme court rejected Industrial Indemnity's
argument that a violation of RCW § 48.30.010 did not afford
CPA liability because this section was enacted prior to the
CPA.73 Instead, the court cited the legislature's express provi-
sion that violations of the insurance code and regulations are
subject to the CPA.74  The court also noted that RCW
§ 48.30.010 had been amended three times since the enactment
of the CPA.7" Because the legislature had the opportunity, its
failure to amend this section was perceived by the court as an
indication of legislative intent not to afford the insurance
industry immunity from CPA liability. 6
IV. CRITIQUE OF KALLEvIG
A. The Bad Faith Analysis
The Kallevig court's imposition of the reasonable justifica-
tion standard to determine whether Industrial Indemnity acted
69. Id.
70. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 (1990) provides:
RCW § 48.30.010 authorizes the commissioner to define methods of
competition and acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance
which are unfair or deceptive. The purpose of this regulation, WAC §§ 284-30-
300 through 284-30-410, is to define certain minimum standards which, if
violated with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, will be
deemed to constitute unfair claims settlement practices (emphasis added).
71. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 924, 792 P.2d at 530.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 924-25, 792 P.2d at 530.
74. Id. at 924, 792 P.2d at 530 (citing the legislature's adoption of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.86.170, which provides that "actions and transactions prohibited or regulated
under the laws administered by the insurance commissioner" are subject to the CPA).
75. Id. at 925, 792 P.2d at 530.
76. Id.
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in bad faith in denying the Kallevigs' claim was consistent with
prior case law in Washington.77 Two observations can be made
about the imposition of this standard in Kallevig. First,
although the reasonable justification standard may adversely
impact an insurer's planning ability because the insurer may
have difficulty predicting what will be considered reasonable
conduct during a future review, this standard of review accom-
modates public interests more thoroughly than proposed sub-
stitutes. Second, while the reasonable justification standard in
Kallevig may be more onerous than a standard employed in
the subsequent appellate court case of Gingrich, adoption of
the Kallevig standard will avoid potential confusion and more
efficiently accommodate fair settlement practices.
1. Impact Upon Insurance Company Practices
The Kallevig court reviewed the insurer's conduct to
determine whether the insurer was reasonably justified in
denying the Kallevigs' claim. The imposition of this reasonable
justification standard can create a difficult position for the
insurer from the planning perspective. Unless analogous situa-
tions were previously decided to give an insurer an indication
of the type of activity that is considered reasonable, the insurer
may have a difficult time establishing policies and procedures
to assure that its conduct complies with what a reviewing
court, with the benefit of hindsight, would consider reasonable.
This uncertainty also impacts the insurer's rate-making ability
because of the uncertainty surrounding the estimation of pro-
spective loss experience.78
This uncertainty could undermine one of the values under-
lying the legislature's adoption of the unfair settlement prac-
tices regulations: predictability.7s By actually identifying those
77. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
78. Pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 48.19.030, insurers must give due
consideration to several factors in making insurance rates. These factors include past
and prospective loss experience, operating expenses, investment income, and
reasonable underwriting profit. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.19.030(3) (1989).
79. In 1977, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners developed a
model act to address the concerns raised by the insurance industry about the lack of
standardization and accepted procedures to be followed in processing claims. LONG,
supra note 27, at § 5B.10. The lack of such standardization caused difficulty for
counsel representing insurance companies to argue that their client acted reasonably.
Id. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 (1990) follows the model act in adopting a
frequency requirement. MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, ACT
RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS
AND PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE § 4(9) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1977).
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actions that were considered unfair, the legislature established
specific guides to compare an insurer's actions. These guides
served as notice to the insurance industry of those practices
that would subject an insurer to extra-contractual liability
under the CPA. However, the predictability provided by these
guides may be impaired by the use of a reasonable justification
standard in reviewing actions of insurers.
Although concerns can be raised about the lack of predict-
ability under the reasonable justification standard, alternative
standards appear to provide no appreciable gain in predictabil-
ity. And of the proposed standards, the reasonable justification
standard more effectively promotes the public's interest in fair
insurance settlements.8° In fact, the Kallevig court rejected an
alternative standard suggested in an amicus brief filed with the
court that would have placed a higher burden on the insured
bringing a bad faith action.' Although not expressly stated in
the Kallevig opinion, the court's rejection of this proposed test
and imposition of the reasonable justification standard are
likely based upon the court's strong interest in promoting the
public interest.8 2 Thus, concerns about the lack of predictabil-
According to a letter dated March 23, 1983, written to Ronald Gene Meyers by Scott
Jarvis, a deputy commissioner with the Washington State Insurance Commissioner's
office, this model act was used as a pattern by Washington's insurance commissioner in
preparing the state regulations in this area. Letter from Scott Jarvis to Ronald Gene
Meyers (Mar. 23, 1983) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
However, the insurance commissioner's unfair settlement practices regulations were
not specifically intended to provide a private right of action. See supra note 54.
80. Some courts have considered the imposition of liability using negligence
terminology. See ASHLEY, supra note 2, at § 2:04-2:05 (stating that a majority of courts
have expressed an insurer's duty in considering settlement offers in terms of good
faith, not due care). In addition, approximately 20 jurisdictions have recognized a
common law tort for bad faith conduct by an insurer. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, at
§ 1.33. Lastly, some courts have considered a strict liability standard in situations
where the insurer rejects a settlement within policy limits. Although the
predictability of such a standard would be high, this standard has not gained
widespread approval. ASHLEY, supra note 2, at § 2:13.
81. Brief of amicus curiae at 4-6 (Pemco Insurance Co., Safeco Insurance Co., State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Mutual of Enumclaw, The Grange Insurance Association,
The Unigard Group), Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d
520 (1990) (No. 56389-6). For a bad faith claim, the brief cited a test that required the
plaintiff to show a lack of reasonable basis for denying a claim and the defendant's
knowledge or reckless disregard for the lack of a reasonable basis for denial. Id. at 4
(citing a test imposed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Anderson v. Continental Ins.
Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978)).
82. See McRae v. Bolstad, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 676 P.2d 496 (1984); Anhold v. Daniels,
94 Wash. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980). In Anhold, the plaintiff, an unemployed woman,
brought a CPA claim against the promoters of a restaurant in which she was an
investor. The woman asserted that the promoters made false representations about
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ity caused by use of a reasonable justification standard are
diminished when alternative standards and the court's strong
preference in protecting the public interest are considered.
2. Discrepancy Between the Kallevig and Gingrich Decisions
A more troubling result of the Kallevig court's use of the
reasonable justification standard is the potential discrepancy
that may have been created in disputes involving a question of
fact or a question of law. The dispute in Kallevig concerning
whether the insurer was reasonably justified in concluding the
insured committed arson was characterized as a question of
fact.' In Gingrich v. Unigard Security Insurance Co., how-
ever, a Washington appellate court addressed the interpreta-
tion of the language within an insurance policy and approached
the dispute as one posing a question of law; the court then
applied a standard different from Kallevig.84 After reviewing
her opportunity to become a partner in the venture. Anhold, 94 Wash. 2d at 41-42, 614
P.2d at 186. The Anhold court stated that a private individual must show that an act is
unfair or deceptive within the sphere of trade or commerce and that the act must
impact the public interest. Id. at 45, 614 P.2d at 188. In deciding whether the public
interest element is present, courts may take note of specific legislative declaration that
recognizes a public interest. Id. at 43, 614 P.2d at 186-87 (citing Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978), in which the presence of public
interest in the insurance business was held to exist). In addition to specific legislative
declaration, the court stated that the public interest element could be satisfied as
follows:
[The presence of public interest is demonstrated when the proof establishes
that (1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of trade or commerce has induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting;
(2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about by such action or failure to act;
and (3) the defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the potential for
repetition.
Anhold, 94 Wash. 2d at 46, 614 P.2d at 188. Applying this test, the Anhold court
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the CPA claim and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration. Id. at 47, 614 P.2d at 189.
This test for determining the presence of public interest in a CPA claim was
applied and satisfied in McRae, which involved a real estate agent's failure to disclose
problems with a residence being purchased. McRae, 101 Wash. 2d at 161, 676 P.2d at
496 (holding the likelihood additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured satisfies
the potential for repetition requirement).
83. Gingrich v. Unigard Security Ins. Co., 57 Wash. App. 424, 433, 788 P.2d 1096,
1102 (1990).
84. Id. at 434, 788 P.2d at 1102. The appellant, Gingrich, challenged the trial
court's decision granting a summary judgment motion for dismissal of a CPA claim.
Gingrich was injured in an accident involving a pickup truck. Title to the pickup had
been transferred two days earlier to Gingrich from his father. Id. at 425, 788 P.2d at
1098. Gingrich did not pay for the truck and understood he would transfer the title
back to his parents after they returned from an emergency trip. Id. at 427, 788 P.2d at
1098-99. Finding that the transfer was a bailment, the court held that the ownership of
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the determination of this legal dispute, the Gingrich court held
that the trial court's dismissal of the cause of action on sum-
mary judgment, based on the CPA, was justified because the
insurer's position was "not unreasonable, frivolous, or
untenable.""
By comparing the standards of review employed in Ging-
rich and Kallevig, the discrepancy arises. The reasonable jus-
tification standard applied in Kallevig arguably establishes a
more onerous standard upon the insurer by requiring it to
show reasonable justification for denying an insured's claim.
In comparison, the Gingrich standard merely requires the
insurer to show that its position is not unreasonable. One
could conclude that Kallevig and Gingrich both impose a "rea-
sonableness" test. However, a plaintiff's attorney may be able
to formulate a successful argument that the Kallevig reason-
able justification standard imposes a more affirmative obliga-
tion on the insurer to show justification for a claim denial. In
comparison, the Gingrich standard arguably requires a lesser
showing of justification; the insurer's act cannot be frivolous,
untenable, or unreasonable.
The existence of these two similar, yet potentially distinct
standards of review for situations involving denial of coverage
based upon a question of fact or law is troublesome. A justifi-
cation for this discrepancy can be found in the desire to give
insurers more leniency when they are faced with a situation
involving a question of law, such as an insurance policy inter-
pretation question. Any benefit derived from applying this
more lenient standard, however, is substantially outweighed by
the impact upon policy holders. The Gingrich standard
encourages insurers to phrase claim denials in terms of a policy
interpretation rather than upon the evidence supporting the
claim. By doing so, insurers may invoke a more lenient stan-
dard of review should judicial review occur. As a result, the
strong public interest implicated in the analysis of CPA claims
is frustrated. 86 While the reasonable justification standard
employed in Kallevig imposes CPA liability to promote, in
the truck remained with the parents. Id. at 432, 788 P.2d at 1101. As such, the court
upheld the trial court's determination that Gingrich was entitled to personal injury
protection under the parents' insurance policy because ownership was not transferred.
Id.
85. Id. at 434, 788 P.2d at 1102.
86. See supra note 82.
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part, the protection of the public interest, this standard is
arguably circumvented by the Gingrich standard.
Because of the potential inconsistency of the "reasonable
justification" and "unreasonable, frivolous, or untenable" stan-
dards, the courts should reconsider this issue and apply one
standard in insurance bad faith litigation to ensure that a con-
sistent standard of review is applied. Resolving this inconsis-
tency will, in turn, promote predictability 7 and prevent the
intentional circumvention of one standard for the other. Upon
reconsideration of this issue, the Kallevig reasonableness stan-
dard should be employed in situations like Gingrich that
involve questions of law. The Kallevig standard is more suita-
ble because it substantially supports the public interest by
imposing a higher standard of conduct to measure an insurer's
actions."s By allowing circumvention of the Kallevig standard
by use of the Gingrich standard, the legislature's apparent
intent in applying the CPA to insurance bad faith litigation is
similarly circumvented. Thus, the replacement of the Ging-
rich standard with the Kallevig reasonable justification stan-
dard, for coverage actions involving questions of law will
further the public interest by promoting fair settlement
practices.
Presuming the standard for measuring an insurer's con-
duct is clarified, a second issue raised in bad faith litigation is
whether CPA liability should be imposed if the insurer's con-
duct fails to satisfy the reasonable justification standard. In
Kallevig, after finding a breach of the insurer's duty of good
faith based on a violation of the insurance commissioner's
unfair settlement practice regulations, the court considered the
imposition of CPA liability. 9
87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 82. In addition to the judicial recognition of the public interest
in McRae and Anhold, the Washington State Legislature has specifically declared that
the CPA is to be liberally construed. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1989). In
describing the purposes behind the CPA, this section provides, in part, that
the intent of the legislature [is] that this act shall not be construed to prohibit
acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and
preservation of business or which are not injurious to the public interest, nor
be construed to authorize those acts or practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or are unreasonable per se. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 920, 792 P.2d 520, 528
(1990).
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B. The Imposition of CPA Liability
The imposition of CPA liability by the Kallevig court
results in three noteworthy consequences. First, liability
under the CPA includes several noncontractual remedies 0
Second, the imposition of CPA liability based upon a single vio-
lation of the commissioner's unfair settlement regulations dis-
regards a frequency requirement that applies to those
regulations. Third, imposing CPA liability upon insurers may
substantially alter their behavior in handling claims. For
example, the prospect of CPA liability may create an incentive
for insurers to pay out claims when the claim payout is less
than the anticipated costs of a more thorough investigation.
This incentive is particularly acute when the claim is small in
comparison to the necessary investigation costs. Thus, even if
paying claims may be economically efficient in this situation, a
public policy question is raised regarding whether encouraging
payment of potentially undeserving claims is appropriate. Con-
versely, insurers may respond to this noncontractual liability
by expending an economically inefficient amount of resources
on investigations in fear of CPA liability. If either of these
responses occur, the insurance purchasing public would
undoubtedly bear the costs of these questionable pay-outs and
increased investigations through increased premiums.91 There-
fore, CPA liability should only be imposed in situations where
promotion of the purposes behind the CPA 2 outweighs these
potential costs.
In Kallevig, the court found CPA liability by reasoning
that a single violation of WAC § 284-30-330 constitutes an
unfair trade practice under RCW § 48.30.010. 91 As such, a per
se unfair business practice is created for purposes of determin-
ing CPA liability in a private action. The Kallevig court's anal-
ysis, however, misreads the explicit authorization granted to
the insurance commissioner in RCW § 48.30.010(2). Under
RCW § 48.30.010(2), the commissioner is authorized to define
other unfair business acts and practices by regulation. One of
the regulations adopted pursuant to this authorization is WAC
§ 284-30-330, which the court relied upon as supporting the
RCW § 48.30.010 violation. Although relying on the commis-
90. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 78.
92. See supra notes 27 and 28.
93. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d at 924, 792 P.2d at 530.
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sioner's regulation to support the statutory violation, the court
dismissed the frequency requirement that is applicable to WAC
§ 284-30-330. The court stated that "[t]he language of RCW
§ 48.30.010 is plain and unambiguous. RCW § 48.30.010 does
not contain the frequency requirement set forth in WAC § 284-
30-300." 4
The Kallevig court's analysis unjustifiably disregards the
frequency requirement adopted by the insurance commissioner
in conjunction with WAC § 284-30-330."s WAC § 284-30-330 was
adopted by the commissioner to define specific unfair acts or
practices that fall within RCW § 48.30.010. As such, the regula-
tion incorporates the frequency requirement" of WAC § 284-
30-300. The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington implicitly adopted this view, dismissing a
CPA claim against an insurer because the evidence failed to
suggest the insurer violated the insurance commissioner's reg-
ulations with such frequency as to satisfy WAC § 284-30-300.1
Similarly, in analyzing whether RCW § 48.30.010 was violated
in Kallevig, the Washington Supreme Court should have con-
sidered whether the frequency requirement in WAC § 284-30-
300 was satisfied prior to finding a violation of the statute.
Recognized administrative law doctrine also supports this
conclusion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
administrative regulations have the force and effect of law
when they are reasonably adapted to the administration of a
legislative act.9" However, an administrative agency's authority
to adopt regulations is clearly not unlimited; an agency may
not adopt regulations that modify or amend a statute.99 In this
situation, WAC § 284-30-300 does not modify or amend what
constitutes an unfair practice under RCW § 48.30.010. Rather,
94. Id.
95. According to Washington State Register 78-08-082, the statutory authority for
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 is found in two
statutes: WASH. REV. CODE § 48.02.060 (1989) (creating the insurance commissioner's
general regulation making authority) and WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010 (establishing
the general unfair practices statute).
96. See supra note 70.
97. See Underwriters at Lloyds v. Denali Seafoods, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 721, 727
(W.D. Wash. 1989).
98. General Services Admin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming
a lower court's decision that the agency be enjoined from withholding certain records
regarding a property transaction).
99. State er rel. Living Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 95 Wash. 2d 753, 759, 630 P.2d 925,
929 (1981) (citing Kitsap-Mason Dairymen's Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 77 Wash. 2d
812, 467 P.2d 312 (1970)).
1991]
226 University of Puget Sound Law Review
this requirement merely acts as part of the definition of other
methods of competition that the commissioner found to be
unfair or deceptive. Moreover, the frequency requirement
does not modify or amend the CPA because the requirement
only defines what constitutes other unfair practices under the
insurance code. As such, the unfair settlement practices regu-
lations, and particularly the frequency requirement, adopted
by the commissioner pursuant to RCW § 48.30.010 do not mod-
ify or amend the statute. Therefore, the frequency require-
ment in WAC § 284-30-300 should be employed to determine
whether an act violates RCW § 48.30.010.
The court dismisses the application of the frequency
requirement by distinguishing the court's use of WAC § 284-30-
330 from the insurance commissioner's enforcement authority
under the regulation."° This distinction, however, is question-
able because the court is using the regulation for the purpose
for which it was adopted: to define unfair acts or practices in
the insurance industry for purposes of RCW § 48.30.010. As
the court suggests, the frequency requirement may serve as a
benchmark for bringing administrative enforcement actions.
This use, however, does not support the court's conclusion that
the requirement is solely applicable in administrative situa-
tions. Rather, acting pursuant to specific authorization in
RCW § 48.30.010, the commissioner defined other unfair acts or
practices under Washington State's insurance code when the
commissioner adopted WAC § 284-30.101 Included in that defi-
nition of unfair acts or practices is the frequency requirement
of WAC § 284-30-300. Thus, the court's decision finding a viola-
tion of RCW § 48.30.010 through a single violation of WAC
§ 284-30-330 fails to account for a necessary frequency require-
ment contained within WAC § 284-30-300.
In addition to failing to recognize the commissioner's
authority to define other unfair acts or practices, the court's
analysis is flawed from a policy standpoint. By finding a viola-
tion of RCW § 48.30.010 from a single violation of the unfair
settlement practices regulations, the court gives a private party
more enforcement authority through private litigation than
the insurance commissioner through administrative actions.10
2
100. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 924, 792 P.2d 520, 530
(1990).
101. See supra note 55.
102. See William R. Hickman, Court Gives Juries More Power Than the Insurance
Commisgioner, INSURANCEWEEK, July 6, 1990, at 23. One could argue that the
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While the commissioner is bound to find a violation with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice,103 a single
violation is sufficient in a private lawsuit alleging a CPA viola-
tion.1°4 This result appears contrary to the legislature's intent
in authorizing the insurance commissioner to define other
unfair practices or acts.105
As a result, the Washington State Legislature should
review the statutory and regulatory methodology for bad faith
insurance actions created by the Kallevig decision. This review
should result in the adoption of legislation amending the
unfair practices statute to include a frequency requirement.
By amending the statute in this manner, Washington would
move one step closer to codifying the model unfair trade prac-
tices statutory language adopted in other states."° Such an
amendment would also respect the apparent legislative intent
underlying RCW § 48.30.010 by further enabling the commis-
sioner to define other unfair practices. The amendment would
similarly reflect the commissioner's intent to preclude private
rights of action under the unfair claim settlement practices
regulations and would alleviate the disparate enforcement
power that currently exists between the general public and the
insurance commissioner. Specific statutory recognition of a
frequency requirement also would diminish concerns about the
lack of predictability for insurers currently arising from this
disparate enforcement power and would reduce inefficient
investigations by insurers. Thus, whether at the request of a
legislative standing committee on insurance or from an execu-
tive request by the insurance commissioner's office, the Wash-
ington State Legislature should adopt legislation recognizing
this frequency requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of bad faith insurance litigation in Wash-
ington during the past twenty-five years illustrates the recogni-
insurance commissioner is not bound by the frequency requirement within WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 because the commissioner has the authority to amend the
regulation. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.02.060 (1989). While the frequency requirement
may be arbitrary and subject to revision, the requirement is currently in place and
applicable to an enforcement action by the commissioner under this regulation.
103. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-300 (1990).
104. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520 (1990).
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.010(2) (1989).
106. See Stegmaier, supra note 26, at 996.
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tion by the Washington State Legislature and judiciary of the
special relationship between an insurer and insured. 1"7 This
relationship is marked by a lack of bargaining power on the
part of the insured and by the public interest nature of the
insurance business." 8 In light of this relationship, bad faith
insurance litigation developed to require an insurer to act in
good faith and to possess a reasonable justification for denying
an insured's claim. 1°9
In Washington, however, a discrepancy has developed
between two standards for reviewing the denial of an insured's
claim depending upon whether the denial is based on a ques-
tion of law or a question of fact."0 This discrepancy results in
an arguably more lenient standard in situations involving a
question of law. The presence of this more lenient standard
may create a means to circumvent the reasonable justification
standard employed by the Kallevig court and dilute the pur-
poses underlying the reasonable justification standard. Conse-
quently, the Washington Supreme Court should revisit this
issue at the first opportunity and adopt the reasonable justifi-
cation standard employed in Kallevig in both question of fact
and question of law situations.
The court should also reconsider its analysis for imposing
CPA liability in Kallevig. In holding that a single violation of
the insurance commissioner's regulation defining unfair settle-
ment practices constitutes a violation of RCW § 48.30.010, the
court's analysis dismisses the regulations' frequency require-
ment without sufficient justification. Thus, the legislature
should redirect the court to abandon that portion of its reason-
ing in Kallevig and give proper deference to the regulations'
frequency requirement. The legislature can accomplish this
direction by amending RCW § 48.30.010 to expressly incorpo-
rate this frequency requirement.
107. See supra note 4.
108. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030; SHERNOFF, supra, note 2.
109. See Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520
(1990).
110. Compare Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520
(1990) (employing a reasonable justification standard to review a CPA claim) with
Gingrich v. Unigard Security Ins. Co., 57 Wash. App. 424, 788 P.2d 1102 (1990) (stating
an insurer will be exposed to CPA liability if the insurer's actions are unreasonable,
frivolous, or untenable).
[Vol. 15:203
